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PART I: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
ET AL. V. SEBELIUS: A SUMMARY OF THE RECENT
HEALTHCARE DECISION
NICOLE TACHIBANA1
All eyes were on the Supreme Court this summer as the Court prepared to decide an important decision during a contentious election year.
The case was National Federation of Independent Business et al. v.
Sebelius, and it decided the constitutionality of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).2 PPACA was challenged as unconstitutional by twenty-six states. The Court’s majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, focused on two key parts of the Act:
the individual mandate and the Medicare expansion. Below is a summary
of the majority opinion.
A. PPACA’S “INDIVIDUAL MANDATE” IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BUT IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER CONGRESS’S
TAXING POWER.
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan. Roberts started by reiterating the mission of the Court: to
simply decide whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to
enact the challenged provisions. He discussed the Court’s limited role of
policing the boundaries while not considering whether the Act has sound
policies. He stated that the “Court [is] vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make
policy judgments.”3 It is the sole responsibility of the Court to enforce
the limits of federal power to those defined and enumerated within the
Constitution and to strike down those acts that “transgress those limits.”4
First, Roberts examined whether the Court had standing to hear the
case. Under the Anti-Injunction Act,5 suits that try to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax are barred. To prevent disruption to the
“stream of revenue,” the Anti-Injunction Act requires that individuals
first pay the tax and then challenge the tax for a refund. Congress, how1. J.D. 2012, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. This is the first part in a multipart series on the healthcare decision. This part focuses on the majority opinion. The next part will
focus on the concurring and dissenting opinions.
2. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (the section at issue is the so-called “individual mandate.”).
3. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. __,*6 (2012).
4. Id. at *6.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) provides, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”
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ever, did not refer to the payments under this Act as a “tax” but as a
“shared responsibility payment”6 or a “penalty” for those who refused to
obtain health insurance. The Government argued, and the Court agreed,
that PPACA’s statutory language directing the Secretary of the Treasury
to use the same tools he uses to collect taxes to collect this “penalty” was
not a mandate for the courts to apply the Anti-Injunction Act. This language was to be used by the Secretary as merely a guide on how to collect the penalty. Therefore, because PPACA’s statutory language did not
mandate that the penalty be treated as a tax for the purposes of the AntiInjunction Act, the suit was not barred, and the Court had standing to
decide the substantive issues presented.
The Court addressed the Government’s first argument that the individual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and then
addressed the Government’s second argument that, alternatively, the
individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’s Taxing Power.
i. Avoiding the “impetuous vortex”: Congress does not have the power
under the Commerce Clause to compel individuals to become engaged in interstate activity.
The Government argued that the individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Congress was faced
with an expensive cost-shifting issue: hospitals under certain state and
federal laws are required to provide care regardless of the patient’s ability to pay. This results in uninsured patients receiving care that they cannot pay for. This cost is passed on to the insurers in the form of higher
rates. The insurers then pass the costs to the insured in the form of higher
premiums. Congress estimated that care for uninsured patients “raises
family health insurance premiums, on average, by over $1,000 per
year.”7 Insurance companies, in addition, are reluctant to add to their
burden by insuring those individuals most in need of health insurance,
those with preexisting conditions. The result is individuals go uninsured
and seek medical treatment that they cannot afford, which ultimately
increases the burden on the system as a whole by contributing to higher
rates for all.
Congress created PPACA’s individual mandate as a cure to these issues. First, Congress required that insurance companies insure those with
preexisting conditions. Then Congress mandated a certain level of care in
the form of minimum essential insurance coverage. This is a very expensive proposition: insure more people and provide more benefits to those
people. These goals can only be accomplished by requiring healthy individuals, who do not normally seek health insurance, to pay into the system as well. This is where the individual mandate comes into play. The
6.
7.

26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) refers to the penalty as the “shared responsibility payment.”
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*16.
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individual mandate requires that individuals without insurance either get
insurance or pay a penalty. This extra infusion of income, from presumably healthier people who use fewer benefits, allows the insurance companies to afford to cover more benefits for more people.
Roberts pointed out that “Congress has never attempted to rely [on
the Commerce Clause] to compel individuals not engaged in commerce
to purchase an unwanted product.”8 Examining the Commerce Clause, he
stated that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce” under Article I, Section 8, clause 3. There is no mention of the
power to create commerce. Roberts argued that the term “regulate” does
not equate to the term “create.” He pointed to some of Congress’s other
powers to support this distinction. For instance, Congress has the power
to coin money (to create) and the power to regulate the value thereof (to
regulate); both the power to create and regulate are conferred by the
Constitution. Here, the individual mandate does not regulate but seeks to
create; it “compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product.”9
Roberts refused to permit Congress to construe the Commerce
Clause in this manner. Doing so would grant Congress powers that are
“new and potentially vast”10 and allow Congress to draw all activities
into the Commerce Clause’s domain and its “impetuous vortex.”11
Because Roberts dismissed the Commerce Clause argument, the
Necessary and Proper Clause argument failed as well. The Necessary and
Proper Clause, granting Congress the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”12 its enumerated powers, does not carry any substantive and independent powers of
its own. It can only properly work in conjunction with a valid enumerated action by Congress. Here, Congress’s actions under the Commerce
Clause were improper and could not be saved solely by the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
ii. The individual mandate lives another day: Congress has the power
under the Taxing Power to tax individuals who forgo health insurance.
Roberts next turned to the Government’s argument that the individual mandate merely imposes a tax on individuals who forgo health insurance, a valid use of the federal government’s taxing power to “lay and
collect Taxes.”13 Borrowing from the language of Justices Joseph Story
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at *18.
Id. at *20 (emphasis in original).
Id. at *20
Id. at *23.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roberts acknowledged the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance. Under this doctrine, when a statute has more
than one possible, reasonable meaning, courts in their role of interpreting
the laws should adopt the meaning that does not violate the constitution
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionally.
PPACA’s plain language commands individuals to purchase insurance. Interpreting the individual mandate as a command under the Commerce Clause is invalid, according to Roberts Congress cannot compel
individuals to become engaged in commerce by purchasing a product.
This reading of the Act is unconstitutional. However, Roberts pointed out
that the Government’s second argument, that this was a tax and valid
under Congress’s taxing power, is a reasonable interpretation of the
Act.14 Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this reasonable
reading of the Act would save the act.
Roberts instead turned to the substance and application of the “share
responsibility payment” to determine the correct interpretation. Using a
three-part functional approach found in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture,15 the
Court examined whether the tax or exaction: (1) imposed an exceedingly
heavy burden for a small infraction; (2) had a scienter requirement typically found in punitive statutes as a punishment; and (3) was enforced by
an agency responsible for punishing violations rather than collecting
revenue.16 For example, in Drexel Furniture, the company employed
children. Congress passed a statute that provided a 10% “tax” on the
company’s net income for hiring even one child (an exceedingly heavy
burden); this tax only applied to those who knowingly employed children
(scienter); and the tax was collected by the Department of Labor (not a
revenue collecting agency).17 The Court found that this was not a tax and
was not authorized under Congress’s taxing power.

14. While a label of a “tax” in the statutory language would require the Anti-Injunction Act to
come into play, the Court was not constrained by that label. The Court has previously sustained
“surcharges” as a tax despite the statutory designation. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
171 (1992) (“[T]he Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge, is no more than a federal
tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either
Congress' commerce or taxing power.”). The Court has also sustained “licensee fees” as a tax under
the License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (1 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866) (“The granting of a license, therefore,
must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing
except that the licensee shall be subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it.”).
15. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (“The difference between a tax and a
penalty is sometimes difficult to define, and yet the consequences of the distinction in the required
method of their collection often are important. Where the sovereign enacting the law has power to
impose both tax and penalty, the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be
immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests
in another.” Id.).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Turning to the individual mandate, the amount due under PPACA’s
penalty is not an exceedingly heavy burden as the penalty will be less
than the price of insurance as set by statute. Second, the penalty does not
contain scienter requirement. Finally, the payment is collected by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but the IRS is statutorily prohibited from
imposing any form of criminal sanctions for failing to pay this penalty.
Under this three-part functional approach, according to Roberts, this
“penalty” can reasonably and properly be called a tax.18
Roberts turned again to the reason he rejected the Government’s
Commerce Clause argument: inactivity. He stated, “If it is troubling to
interpret the Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate those
who abstain from commerce, perhaps it should be similarly troubling to
permit Congress to impose a tax for not doing something.”19
He answered this concern in three parts. First, the Constitution does
not provide any guarantees that the federal government cannot tax inactivity, while the Commerce Clause protects individuals from regulation if
the individuals choose not to engage in the regulated activity. Second,
the Courts have placed limits on Congress’s taxing power. As discussed
above, Congress’s use of the taxing power as a punitive measure exceeds
Congress’s authority under the taxing power. That is not the case here.
Third, the taxing power and power to regulate commerce have different
limits. When Congress regulates commerce under the Commerce Clause,
it can “bring its full weight to bear.”20 This means Congress has to full
power to regulate that behavior, including all criminal sanctions. Here,
Congress limited the power exercised under PPACA to merely paying
the penalty. Congress expressly limited the Secretary of Treasury’s power to collect the penalty, not authorizing any criminal sanctions or fines
for nonpayment.
Roberts concluded by simply stating, “[PPACA’s] requirement that
certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution
permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”21
B. “A GUN TO THE HEAD”: MEDICARE EXPANSION CONDITIONS CROSS
THE LINE FROM PERSUASION TO COERCION.
Roberts next addressed the concern over the Government’s use of
the Spending Clause to coerce the States into expanding their Medicaid
coverage. Generally, Congress has the power under the Spending Clause

18.
19.
20.
21.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*36.
Id. at *41.
Id. at *43.
Id. at *44.
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“to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United
States.”22
The Court has previously limited this power to respect the independent sovereignty of the states under the federal system. Therefore, it
is well-settled that Congress is prohibited from “commandeering” a State
government for its own federal purposes. Borrowing from contract law,
the Court has held that commandeering can take the form of undue influence.23 The State has the sovereign right to enter into a contract with the
federal government to accept funds for the general welfare, and the federal government can place conditions on those funds. However, the State
has the right to enter into the contract “voluntarily and knowingly.”24
Additionally, the federal government can use incentives to achieve federal goals, but, as Roberts pointed out, “when pressure turns into compulsion, the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”25
Turning to the Medicaid expansion, Roberts asked whether the financial inducement offered by Congress was so coercive as to cross the
line from pressure or incentives into compulsion. Under PPACA, the
section at issue was Section 1396c,26 which provided that if a state’s
Medicaid plan does not comply with the new PPACA requirements, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services may cease to provide any further payments to the noncomplying state. The States are required to go
from covering certain individuals—pregnant women, children, needy
families, elderly, and the disabled—to providing “essential health benefits” packages to all individuals under 65-years-old who fall below 133
percent of the federal poverty line.27
PPACA provides that the funding for new recipients will initially be
paid the federal government, decreasing to a minimum funding level of
90 percent.28 The issue is that noncomplying states will not only lose this
additional funding for noncompliance but will also lose all existing Medicaid funding for noncompliance. Roberts said that “the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”29 This “economic dragooning”

22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*47 (citing Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 933
1997).
24. Id.
25. Id. When the federal government requires the State to implement programs that achieve a
federal program, it creates an accountability issue. Namely, the State officials will bear the brunt of
public disapproval while federal officials “remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.” Id. at *48.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
27. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*45-46.
28. Id. at *46.
29. Id. at *51. Medicaid funding is an estimated 20 percent of the average State budget with
the federal government covering 50 to 83 percent of these costs depending on the state. Id.
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leaves the States with no real options and is the epitome of coercion by
the federal government.
The Government also argued that the States agreed to any amendments to Medicaid when they originally accepted the Medicaid program.
The original Medicaid provisions, after all, granted the Government the
right to “alter, amend, or repeal” any provision.30 Roberts acknowledged
this power but stated that the statute contemplates a right to make adjustments as the program grew. However, Roberts pointed out, this alteration changes the program from one that provides for specifically needy
groups to one that will provide for the “entire nonelderly population with
income below 133 percent of the poverty level,”31 creating a universal
health insurance coverage under the existing Medicaid structure.
Robert struck down the provision allowing the Secretary to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for any noncomplying state. The States
are, therefore, free to reject the Medicaid expansion requirements without fear of losing the entirety of the State Medicaid funding.
Roberts, striving to stay within the Constitutional limits of the
Court’s power, turned to Congress’s intent on whether striking the offending provision required the Court to invalidate the entire Act. He stated that holding does not affect the continued application of the existing
provisions and that merely limiting the financial pressure from the Medicaid expansion section brings PPACA into Constitutional compliance.
In sum, the majority of the Court was persuaded by the Government’s argument that the individual mandate was a valid use of Congresses Commerce Clause power. Roberts stated that this argument fails
because Congress has the power to regulate commerce, not to create
commerce. However, the individual mandate was saved by the Government’s second argument; the individual mandate can reasonably be interpreted as a tax. Next, Roberts struck down the conditions Congress
placed in the Medicaid expansion funds, saying Congress unconstitutionally crossed the line. Instead of creating incentives to comply with the
program, Congress’s coercive “all or nothing” proposition left the States
with no real options. The Medicaid expansion conditions were severable
from the rest of PPACA, leaving PPACA essentially intact.32

30.
31.
32.

42 U.S.C. § 1304.
Id. at *53.
Part II of this article will address the concurring and the dissenting opinions.

